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NOTES
section 7, the Supreme Court could disregard that decision here,
where the FPC ordered curtailments to prevent discrimination
under section 4 of the act.88
In deciding this case the Court realized that a national prob-
lem existed that had to be solved to prevent disruption in the
natural gas industry, and to protect the public. The FPC was
properly acting under its general grant of authority in the ab-
sence of more recent congressional action. 4 This case should
put other direct sale purchasers of gas for "inferior" 85 uses on
notice that similar plans could be formulated by the FPC to
protect the consuming public as the natural gas crisis becomes
critical.
Ronald R. Gonzales
PROBABLE CAUSE: VERACITY OF UNDERLYING FACTS
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana.' A
search warrant, whereby the crucial evidence was obtained, was
issued largely on the basis of statements made by a confidential
informer which the affiant, a police officer, believed in good
faith to be true. The district court sustained a motion to sup-
press2 after an evidentiary hearing showed that the informer
had lied as to the facts contained in the supporting affidavit. The
Louisiana supreme court granted writs to review the sustaining
of the motion to suppress. Held, the truthfulness of the facts
set out in an affidavit supporting a search warrant may not later
be attacked at a hearing on a motion to suppress. State v. An-
selnmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So.2d 98 (1971).
The question of whether the underlying facts supporting a
finding of probable cause are actually true is a different one
33. 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1970).
34. See generally Fuch, The New Administrative State: Judicial Sanction
for Agency Self-Determination in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 216, 244 (1969): "If actual abuse at the administrative level should take
place, it would probably be checked by judicial reversal or new legislation;
and action by the legislature to overcome overbold decisions by agencies or
courts in the construction of statutes is available as well."
35. "Inferior" use is burning natural gas for Industrial purposes where
more abundant energy sources could be substituted. FPC v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 8 (1961).
1. LA. R.S. 40:971 (3)(c) (Supp. 1970): "It is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance...."
2. IA. CODs CRam. P. art. 703A.
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from whether the facts, assumed to be true, are sufficient to
establish probable cause.3 Anselmo is concerned with both of
these questions, but only the question of actual veracity will be
considered here.4
Whether to allow an attack upon the truthfulness of the
underlying factual allegations in an affidavit supporting a search
warrant is a question of first instance in Louisiana. The same
may be said of the corresponding problem concerning the effect
of material falsifications in the affidavit once such falsifications
are made known to the court. The United States Supreme Court
has expressly left the issue undecided" and the decisions of other
state and federal courts offer little guidance. Some cases have
reached the same result as Anselmo,0 while others have allowed
attack upon the factual veracity in varying degrees. An attack
3. See, e.g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); United
States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Halsey, 257
F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); People .v. Mitchell, 45 Ill.2d 148, 258 N.E.2d
345 (1970).
4. For excellent discussions of whether to allow attacks upon the verac-
ity of the underlying facts see Comment, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 96 (1971);
Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Sup-
pressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1971); Mascolo, Impeaching the
Credibility of Affidavits for Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of
Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970); Comment, 63 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 41 (Mar.
1972).
5. "Petitioner attacks the validity of the search warrant. This Court
has never passed directly on the extent to which a court may permit such
examination when the search warrant is valid on its face and when the
allegations of the underlying affidavit establish 'probable cause'; however,
assuming, for the purpose of this decision, that such attack may be made,
we are of the opinion that the search warrant here is valid." Rugendorf v.
United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964). The court proceeded to imply
that had there been perjury on the part of the afflant, the evidence would
have been inadmissible: "The factual inaccuracies depended upon by peti-
tioner to destroy probable cause . . . were of only peripheral relevancy to
the showing of probable cause and, not being with the personal knowledge
of the affliant, did not go to the integrity of the affidavit." Id. at 532. (Em-
phasis added.)
6. Dixon v. United States, 211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1954); Kenney v. United
States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946); People v. Stansberry, 47 Ill.2d 541,
269 N.E.2d 431, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); People v. Nakon, 46 Ill.2d
561, 264 N.E.2d 204 (1970); People v. Mitchell, 45 Ill.2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345
(1970); People v. Bak, 45 Ill.2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341 (1970); People v. Healy,
126 I.App.2d 189, 261 N.E.2d 468 (1970); O'Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405,
326 S.W.2d 759 (1959); Poole v. State, 467 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1971).
A disproportionate number of Illinois decisions are cited due to that
jurisdiction's leadership In isolating and specifically considering the problem
of veracity as opposed to sufficiency. Contra, United States v. Upshaw, 448
F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971); Lerner v. United States, 151 A.2d 184 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1959).
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has been granted as a matter of right in a few decisions. The
better reasoned opinions have permitted an evidentiary chal-
lenge after an initial showing of substantial falsity or police
perjury.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, while not
deciding whether to allow an evidentiary hearing into the verac-
ity of factual allegations, has required that evidence seized due
to the misrepresentations of the affiant be suppressed once the
court becomes aware of such falsification.9
In considering the instant case, it should be noted at the
outset that there is a conflict as to exactly what the majority
decided.'0 The court's opinion phrases the question as such:
"The issue presented is whether the truthfulness of the facts set
out in an affidavit supporting a search warrant may later be
attacked at a hearing on a motion to suppress."" The majority
answered this in the negative, with absolutely no qualifications.
The concurring justices, however, pointed out that the holding
is far too broad and as such should be considered dicta.12 This
criticism appears valid since the only issue before the court was
whether an attack, via a motion to suppress, should be allowed
on the truthfulness of facts derived from a confidential informer
where the affiant, in good faith, believed them to be true. Al-
7. See United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 463 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966)(dictum); King v.
United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d
318, 322 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D. D.C.
1971); United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73 (D. Del. 1964); Lerner v.
United States, 151 A.2d 184 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959); Barker v. State,
241 So.2d 355 (Miss. 1970); O'Bean v. State, 184 So.2d 635 (Miss. 1966); Hen-
derson v. State, 490 P.2d 786 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); cf. United States
ex reZ. Mayfleld v. Pate, 451 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1971).
8. United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1001 (1970); United States ex rel. DeRosa v. La. Vallee, 406 F.2d
807 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dictum); United States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum);
United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); Theodor v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 474, 98 Cal. Rptr. 486 (Ct. App. 4th D. 1971);
People v. Solimine, 18 N.Y.2d 477, 223 NE.2d 341, 276 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1966);
People v. Alflnito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965).
9. "Once it came to the attention of the court ... that evidence had
been seized on the basis of statements of facts erroneously made by the
affiant ... the court was required to grant the motion [to suppress]."
United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1971).
10. See the concurring opinions of Justices Tate and Barham, State v.
Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 322-24, 256 So.2d 98, 104-05 (1971).
11. Id. at 313, 256 So.2d at 101.
12. "The opinion is far broader than the narrow question presented
for our determination. I take issue with the dictum .... " Id. at 324, 256
So.2d at 105.
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though the majority opinion may properly be considered dicta
in part, it nevertheless shows the inclination of our present court
and therefore merits examination. 13
If one grants the correctness of the majority's basic premise
-that probable cause may rest on perjurious allegations by
the affiant-then the court's holding logically follows. The court
pointed out that a defendant aggrieved by an unconstitutional
search may move to suppress the evidence under Article 703 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The constitutional require-
ment for a search warrant is that none shall issue except "upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.' 1 4 The court
then quoted from various opinions which attempted to define
probable cause.15 The thrust of these decisions was that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause is satisfied if a
neutral and independent magistrate makes the determination,
based upon representations in the affidavit, that there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that criminal activity has taken place. In
Anselmo, an independent judicial officer determined from a
sworn affidavit that there was a substantial likelihood that
criminal activity had taken place. Thus, the search was consti-
tutional. Since only an unconstitutional search may be attacked
by a motion to suppress, the defendant could not properly chal-
lenge the search. 6
The majority supported their conclusion by two principal
considerations: the public interest in preserving an effective
informer system,17 and the fear that by allowing an evidentiary
hearing a motion to suppress might take on the characteristics
of a full-scale trial and lengthen an already protracted criminal
process.' 8
The conclusion reached in Anselmo is probably incorrect in
permitting evidence obtained by employing a search warrant
issued on the basis of intentional or negligent misrepresenta-
tions of a police officer to be admissible at trial. There are sev-
13. Hereinafter, references to the court's holding will be to the broad
rule of law laid down In the majority opinion.
14. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); State v. Burnett, 42
N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964).
16. Bee note 6 supra.
17. 260 La. at 321, 256 So.2d at 104.
18. Id. at 320-21, 256 So.2d at 104.
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eral reasons why such a result might be ill-advised, foremost
among them is a lack of the constitutionally required probable
cause. 19 As pointed out by Justice Barham: "Probable cause is
a state of mind. If there is no probable cause in the mind of the
affiant, there can be no basis for legal probable cause upon which
a warrant can stand. ' 20 Another result of allowing such evidence
into trial would be to tacitly approve police perjury.21 Knowing
that the evidence would be admissible, the police would have
strong incentive to slant testimony in order to meet the pre-
requisites for issuance of a search warrant. Since there could
be no attack upon the factual veracity of the affidavit, the risk
of impropriety being discovered is virtually non-existent.
However, the opinion of the court seems correct insofar as
it is limited to the precise factual situation properly before the
court-where a confidential informer lied and the affiant be-
lieved in good faith that he was stating the truth. As pointed
out by the court, the paramount public interest in a viable in-
former system would be seriously impaired if the state had to
produce its informer to counteract the defendant's allegations
of informer falsification at every hearing on a motion to sup-
press.22 Also, the requirement of probable cause is satisfied
where the police officer justifiably believes in, and in good faith
swears to, the truthfulness of an affidavit which is also passed
upon by the issuing judge, even if the facts are later proved
false.2 3
A proper conclusion in this area of the law, as suggested by
the concurring opinions, is to draw a distinction between the
19. People v. Alflnito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243(1965); Henderson v. State, 490 P.2d 786 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); see alao
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1964) (dictum); Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (dictum).
20. 260 La. at 324, 256 So.2d at 105.
21. Id. at 323, 256 So.2d at 104-05; Younger, "The Perjury Routine," 204
THE NATION 596-97 (1967); cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 316 n.2 (1967)(dissenting opinion).
22. E.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957);
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); People v. Bak, 45 Ill.2d 140, 258
1.E.2d 341 (1970); State v. O'Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484 (1970).
23. See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Stacy v. Emery,
97 U.S. 642 (1878); DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969).
Although these cases deal with the probable cause necessary for an arrest
without a warrant, Spine~h. v. United States, 893 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969)
itates that the analysis is basically the same as that used in determining
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
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misrepresentations, whether intentional or negligent, of the
police officer and the misstatements of the informer whom the
police officer justifiably and in good faith believed to be telling
the truth. In the latter instance, the evidence would be admis-
sible, while in the former it would not. Support is given to this
distinction by Mapp v. Ohio,24 which established the principle
that the purpose of the fourth amendment is to prevent unrea-
sonable police behavior and not improper activity on the part
of private citizens.
If this distinction is accepted, the problem then becomes
one of determining when to allow an inquiry into the factual
veracity of the affidavit. Considering the divergent policy con-
siderations, 25 a proper answer might be to require that a con-
tradictory hearing be held only after the defendant has made an
initial showing creating a strong suspicion that there has been
intentional or negligent misrepresentations by the police of-
ficer, affiant.26
Randolph W. Hunter
AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULES OF FORM AND PAROL EVIDENCE
. Offeror signed an agreement to purchase several lots, but
the offeree's signature did not appear in the agreement; how-
ever, his name was typed above offeror's signature. The deposit
stipulated in the written agreement was accepted by offeree.
Later, offeree delivered title to one of the lots described in the
agreement which was accepted by offeror. Offeror sued for the
balance on deposit, asserting that the agreement was not legally
binding because it was never accepted in writing. The trial
court held that the agreement was valid. In affirming, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a contract to sell immovables
which lacks the offeree's signature, the acceptance can be proved
by some unequivocal act showing the offeree's assent to the
offer.1 Alley v. New Homes Promotion, Inc., 247 So.2d 218 (4th
Cir.) writs refused, 258 La. 972, 248 So.2d 832 (1971).
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. The public interest, in insuring that the facts alleged in the affidavit
are actually true, conflicts with the equally important interest of protecting
the anonymity of the informer and insuring a speedy criminal process.
26. See note 8 supra.
1. It is recognized that the issue concerning the formal requirements
in the instant case was not critical to the decision since the court found
[Vol. 3
